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VisitUS identifies primary method of China's diaspora espionage by end of 2025?
Coercion and threats • 25%
Financial incentives • 25%
Cultural and educational exchanges • 25%
No clear method identified • 25%
Official US government reports or credible investigative journalism
China Allegedly Recruits Diaspora for Espionage; Lady Bates Cut Ties with Groups in 2020
Dec 29, 2024, 09:38 AM
Recent reports have highlighted China's alleged use of its diaspora for espionage activities in the United States and the United Kingdom. Investigations reveal that many overseas Chinese individuals may be unwittingly recruited as agents, with their involvement often blurring the lines between voluntary support for the Communist Party and coercion. The Economist noted that some members of the diaspora are genuine supporters of the Party, motivated by business interests in China. Concerns have escalated regarding the tactics employed by the Chinese Communist Party's United Front Work Department, which reportedly utilizes both incentives and pressures to engage individuals in espionage. Amid these revelations, Lady Bates, a Tory peer, disclosed that she severed ties with China-linked groups in 2020 after becoming aware of potential espionage risks. This situation underscores the growing scrutiny of China's influence operations abroad.
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Other methods • 25%
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